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How attacks on Kisiis were planned and executed by the Kipsigis warriors
Before then, there had been no violence on the Borabu side, although the Kisii/Kericho road, which passes through Sotik, had remained barricaded. Kiva and members of her DSIC visited the place where the house had been burnt and convened a meeting in the affected area where, she said, there was a lot of tension. Even as the meeting went on, more houses were being burnt. Thereafter, the violence took the form of spot torching of houses of Kisiis living on the Rift Valley side of the border, as well as sporadic fighting between youths on the border.
Improvised weapons
The Commission was informed by witness number 123 that in the course of the violence, a peace meeting was held in Sotik area and addressed by the leading members of the ODM including Omingo Magara, a Kisii, and Kipkalya Kones, a Kipsigis.
According to the evidence, speaking in Kiswahili, Magara implored the Kipsigis people to stop the fighting with the Kisii people. In Kiswahili, Kones repeated the same message before he switched to speak in Kipsigis. In that language, the witness alleges, he told the Kipsigis to continue with the fighting.
The Commission visited Ribaita Primary School on the Sotik/Borabu border and was informed that the school had been burnt by the Kipsigis during the border fighting between the Kipsigis and Kisii. Several other schools along the common border, including Isoge, Rianyaemo, Saiga-Ngiya, Memusi, Magombo, Kebuse, Raitigo Secondary and Gonzagoza suffered varying levels of destruction.
In Kericho, it was the testimony of Wilson Njenga, the local District Commissioner that violence broke out on December 30, after the announcement of the presidential election results. The following day, a large crowd of people armed with improvised weapons marched on Kericho town from all directions. They invaded the premises of the Co-operative Bank and Equity Bank as well as Stage Mart Supermarket, and gained access after shattering windows and breaking down doors.
Bows and arrows
They helped themselves to whatever of value they could lay their hands on and, according to the local OCPD Aliwa, some people attempted to access cash in the automatic teller machines in the banks. Aliwa added that a number of them who were armed with bows and arrows attacked the police with arrows. Responding with fire, police killed six people and repulsed the rioters.
According to Aliwa, the severest violence in Kericho was on December 30 and 31, 2007 and January 1, 2008. Thereafter, the violence changed form. Whereas, in the first three days or so, rioters confronted the police openly in Kericho town, the violence later moved away into the tea estates and the rural areas.
Further, some of the violence was now carried out at night. DC Njenga estimated that the violence lasted from December 30, 2007 and for the next two weeks or so there was intermittent fighting although, according to him, this had been contained. According to Aliwa, whereas the initial violence was committed by armed youth in the immediacy of their neighbourhoods, the subsequent violence began to display trends of raiders travelling long distances to commit acts of violence outside their home areas.
For example, the attacks in Kipkelion were carried out by raiders coming from other districts. The attack in Mutaragon and Munistry were carried out by raiders from outside these areas. In the particular case of Mutaragon the raiders came from Nandi district. In the case of the attacks in Kericho, some were carried out by people from the neighbouring Buret district. Further, attackers also came from Bomet to attack tea estates which neighbour the district.
Indicative of planning
The Sotik DC, Nakitare, confirmed the existence of this trend when he told the Commission that, in the case of Sotik, attackers came from as far as Pokot. The evidence of co-ordination of the violence is further supported by the Report of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights which related the organised manner in which they were carried out.
According to that Report, in areas like Kipkelion, in advance of contemplated attacks, Kalenjin attackers would place distinctive marks in front of all dwellings that belonged to members of their community as a sign to the raiders as to which houses to pass over when they carried out the attacks.
Traditional calabashes were mentioned as one form of such distinctive marks. The report further stated that in the subsequent days, attacks on settlements were done from all directions and at the same time with clear direction, in a manner indicative of planning.
Another round of serious violence broke out on January 31, 2008, triggered by the killing in Eldoret of the Member of Parliament for Ainamoi, David Too.
One of the outstanding incidents in this violence was the attack by a mob on the Ainamoi DO’s office during which an Administration Police constable, Omar Ahmed Dado, was killed by the mob and his colleague sustained an arrow shot wound. Aliwa described the incident as follows:
“When the message was received, a group of youths attacked Ainamoi DO’s office where PC Omar Dado was stationed. He had a firearm. He tried his best to shoot in the air to scare them but they chased him. "Where he went to hide, they burned that house until he was dragged out, killed and burned on the road. They went further and shot another Administration Police officer with an arrow in the head, they snatched his firearm and they robbed all the buildings… (Thereafter) the criminals who stole the firearms sneaked them in the church where they were recovered.”
One of the saddest personal stories that came out of the Sotik/Borabu violence is that of Simeon Atandi Monyancha, who spoke to the Commission in Borabu. Monyancha was working for the Sotik Tea Highland Company as a tea picker. On February 1, while picking tea, he was attacked and both his hands amputated.
His story as given to the Commission is told below:
I used to be a tea picker at Sotik Tea until February 1, 2008 when I was attacked by Kipsigis raiders who were attacking and burning property belonging to the Kisiis. On this day, I was in the tea estate picking tea. At around 9 am the head boy Mr Daniel Kimetto, told us that there was violence all over and advised us to go to our houses to hide. I went to my house.
I lived in Camp Five which consisted of many Kipsigis. I heard them saying that Kisiis must move out of Camp Five and join fellow Kisiis at Camp Majengo.
After securing a house at Camp Majengo, I packed my household items together with my clothes and began to go to the Camp Majengo… I saw six armed young men with pangas, bows and arrows. They aimed at me with the arrows. I pleaded with them not to shoot me. They put the arrows down and started assaulting me with the pangas. I tried to block the pangas using both my hands to protect my head. I saw my left hand being cut three times.
Then they cut my head on the left hand side. Blood spilt all over my face and I could not see what was happening. I lost consciousness. When I gained consciousness, I found myself in Litein Hospital feeling a lot of pain and both my hands had been amputated. It is during the second wave of violence that Chebilat, a border shopping centre between Sotik and Borabu was burnt extensively.
A Kisii woman whose lifetime investments in a school, located on the Sotik side, was extensively looted testified that there were requests by her Kipsigis neighbours that she should reconsider her decision to flee to the Kisii side, just before her school was burnt, as they feared that her flight would incite the Kisii community and attract retaliatory attacks on them. In the end, however, she had to move to the Kisii side because of fear for her safety when a gang of attackers arrived in her school, and the local people were unable to give her protection.
In her view, some of the attacks were carried out by people from the inland and without regard to the views of the local residents at the border area.
The attackers on her school left for her a message on one of the writing boards in the classrooms which well sums up the feelings that drove the violence. On the board they wrote: “KISIIS AND KALENJINS WILL NEVER LIVE TOGETHER”
The final tally
According to Aden Gedow, the Kipkelion DC, violence erupted on December 30, 2007, with the announcement of the final tally in the presidential election results. The announcement was immediately followed by widespread incidents of arson.
Some areas within the district, in particular the areas of Molo, Soget and Kamatins, had intense skirmishes. Initially, there was an ethnic angle to the arson attacks but this later spilt over to all communities living in the district. Illegal roadblocks were mounted by youth at various spots along the highway, notably at Kapsoit.
The violence also targeted various government installations and resulted in the burning of and vandalism on some buildings and vehicles. The offices of three chiefs, 80 schools, 2 zonal offices and 7 dispensaries were vandalised. One forest guard was killed and there was illegal logging of forests. The Commission conducted an extensive tour of the South Rift Valley area and was struck by the widespread nature of arson on homes of persons not considered to be indigenous to the area.
There was evidence of some level of training in preparation to commit violence. The Commission received evidence in the form of a digital video disk (DVD) recording that was captured in Kuresoi, which borders Kipkelion. The video showed attackers being trained at Kimaranya village in Keringet. The evidence as to training is supported by the evidence of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, which asserted that training and oath-taking took place in camps in preparation for the attacks. The report said:
“The training reportedly took place in the farms of senior leaders in the area or in the region’s forests. One police constable, reportedly trained attackers in Kericho Town. The attackers were well equipped with weapons and materials that they would need to conduct some of their activities, such as power saws used in cutting down huge trees that were used to block the roads.” According to the KNCHR Report the attackers in Kericho, Bureti and Londiani, the latter of which is in Kipkelion, reportedly sent warnings to their victims of the impending attack, before the attacks were actually carried out. Such warnings were delivered by telephone. The Report concludes that on that premise, there was a premeditated intent to forcibly evict the victims from the region.
Review meeting
Further claims regarding the violence was provided by the testimony of a Kipsigis farmer at Sachangwan location, Molo district. The farmer testified regarding a review meeting, to assess whether the violence had met its objects, held in his area at the end of the fighting.
The witness informed the Commission that on February 28, 2008, a meeting was convened by Kalenjins at Baharini to discuss the aftermath of the post-election violence. The meeting was chaired by a retired Assistant Chief, and attended by, among other local leaders.
According to the witness, the background to this meeting was that non-Kalenjin homes had been burnt down and the owners having fled the area, the meeting sought to discuss measures for ensuring the ritual cleansing of the area youth, who had participated in the burning of non-Kalenjin homes during the post election violence, as the burning of residences is considered an abomination under Kalenjin values. He testified that in order to achieve the cleansing of local youths who had participated in the burning of homes, the meeting agreed that a goat would be slaughtered for use in conducting the cleansing.
Secondly, the meeting was the occasion for discussing how farms formerly occupied by those who had fled, would be purchased or hired out affordably. At the meeting, the witness said he disagreed with the idea of sharing out the property of neighbours who had fled from the area to escape the violence. As a result of his opposition, he was viewed as a traitor, and on March 17, 2008, his house was razed down by fellow Kalenjins, most of whom he identified.
Following the killing of the area legislator Too, there was an escalation in the level of violence in the area. According to police reports tendered by Gedow, 47 people died, 27 of them of arrow shots, 7 of injuries using crude weapons, 11 of gun shot wounds and two of burning. Property was also destroyed, with 3,568 buildings totally razed down, 23 buildings partially burnt and 1,542 buildings vandalised. According to Gedow, a large number of persons participated in acts of arson and almost each of them carried a container of petrol for use in the burning. The Commission heard that the main method of burning was by placing accelerants on sticks which would then be propelled by hand onto the targeted buildings. Others would just torch the houses directly.
Police Response
All the district commissioners and members of the police force that the Commission interviewed pronounced themselves satisfied with their response to the post election violence. However the Commission was concerned about a number of specific issues raised by the evidence in relation to their response.
These are discussed below:
The account by government officials in Kericho was they were unaware the there would be post election violence and therefore did to provide for it. The worst case scenario for them was the possibility of violence in the lead up to the elections especially in the areas that they considered to be prone to violence such as Nyagacho and Matobo in Kericho town. There were no contingency arrangements in relation to the violence that ended up engulfing the multinational estates in Kericho and, therefore, no provision to deal with the violence.
The response by the authorities in Kericho to the violence that they thought may happen was to mount peace committee meetings in their areas. Amid the hate messages that have been referred to in the evidence, the local administration carried on with the establishment of peace committees and the convening several meetings in the affected areas. All the officials that the Commission spoke to participated in or facilitated these meetings, which were organised by the Electoral Commission of Kenya. This was its preferred intervention in dealing with the possibility of electoral violence.
People chose to fight
The ECK and other government officials who came before the Commission appeared to derive much satisfaction from the fact that these peace meetings had taken place throughout the country before the elections. They all seemed to regard the organisation of such meetings as sufficient and exonerated themselves from blame for lack of preparation in regard to the violence that eventually occurred in the country.
Officials seemed to ask this question: “What else were we supposed to do if, against our advice, people chose to fight?” With the benefit of what is now known, there must be asked serious questions as to the whether the peace meetings that were convened by the ECK had enduring value or whether they provided the easy option for public officials faced with the hate messages that abounded in the period before the elections and which, in the view of the Commission, played a big role in the post-election violence.
When violence broke out in Kericho town, which was invaded by multitudes of rioters, the police were unprepared to deal with it. They responded with extreme force, killing six people who they claim were among the rioters that had invaded the Co-operative and Equity Banks in the town. The area OCPD, Walter Aliwa, attempted to justify the killing by asserting that the rioters attempted to shoot the police with arrows but there is no evidence whatsoever to support this claim.
Accidental shooting
On the contrary, Aliwa’s evidence that the police shot the rioters because “these were robbers who were breaking banks” is not the real reason why police shot into the crowd. In the view of the Commission, this shooting constitutes an unwarranted use of force by the police and must be investigated. In Borabu, the Commission was told that a policeman in plain clothes shot a man, Joshua Nyarunda. Police later claimed that the shooting was accidental, but no action was taken against the police officer involved.
The sudden onset of riots in the south Rift required police response to multiple situations at the same time. At the beginning of the violence, the strength of personnel in Kipkelion and Kericho districts was 350, of whom 100 were APs. The OCPD had to request for additional personnel from outside the district. These came from the Administration Police, Anti-Stock Theft Unit and the General Service Unit, and arrived on January 1, 2008 or soon thereafter. In Sotik, the DCIO sought fortification both from the Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces, and in all, an additional 200 police officers came in as reinforcement.
Had there been prior planning and appreciation of the possible eventualities, the reinforcement would have been available much earlier and might have prevented much of the initial violence. An example of the inability by the security agencies to make contingency arrangements was provided by Aliwa himself when he testified that he refused to even contemplate that ODM had a chance of winning the elections and therefore did not provide for the possible consequences of such an outcome.
Other than the excessive use of force by police, as exemplified by the Kericho town incident, the Commission received information that police response to rescue people under attack was slow or altogether absent, although in some instances they faced real obstacles. In one incident in Sotik area, the house of a retired couple was surrounded by raiders for nine hours before they were rescued. The wife recounted to the Commission their ordeal as follows:
“On February 5, early in the morning my husband woke up and went to till the farm. Shortly after he went out he came running back to the house. He ordered us to close all the doors and windows. "He told us that he saw a group of Kalenjin youth coming towards our house. A few minutes later we heard their voices outside. They were calling us by our names and they asked us to come out. We recognised their voices. One of them was our neighbour.
Home was surrounded
"At around 9am they started breaking the doors and the windows of the house. They could not break into the house because of the grill reinforcement. I called the chief to come and help us. He sent a vehicle and Administration policemen. "They could not reach us immediately because all the roads leading to Chebilat were barricaded by Kalenjin warriors. They came to us around 6 pm and they escorted us out of the house.”
Another witness who sustained an injury when his home was surrounded and attacked by raiders recounted the following: “When I turned I found that I had been speared on the left, where I am showing you. At that point, I called the chief, the chief told me that there is no way he could assist me. The chief advised me to look for other means of assisting myself.” Fortunately for this witness, police on patrol arrived where he had been attacked and took him to hospital.
Police response to people in distress was hindered not only by the inadequacy of personnel on the part of the security forces, who were simply overwhelmed by the demands on them and were, unable to cope with the situations created by the violence but also because those under attack were spread over long distances in a rural setting. Moreover, the electoral process, to which the police had provided vital support had hardly been concluded by the time they were called upon to deal with the post election violence. A large number of police officers were still on the way back to their duty stations when the violence erupted.
Further, and as the police and other witnesses told the Commission, the emergence of illegal roadblocks hindered police movement, or altogether blocked off access to some of those in need.
Mobile patrols
To deal with the problem of blocked roads, the DSIC put in place a plan to clear the highway. The police deployed personnel on the major highways to monitor spots on the highway prone to blockages and, generally, conduct mobile patrols in the potentially volatile areas. Further, the Commission received evidence that police sometimes stood passively as property was damaged and did nothing to restrain the violence or arrest the perpetrators.
For example the Commission heard that, “Chebilat was not burnt in one day. It was burnt for almost three weeks. There were destructions in front of the officers”.
